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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 21//

TO BARBIAN/COVEY FOR THE SECRETARY

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VIA BLACK PATCH WH60238

TOHAK 21

FEBRUARY 28, 1976

MEMORANDUM FORE FROME SUBJECTS THE PRESIDENT BRENT SCOWCROFT INFORMATION ITEMS

MORI/CDF C03204699

FRENCH FEAR TROUBLE IN MOROCCO: EMBASSY PARTS REPORTS THAT CONVERSATIONS WITH STAFF OFFICERS WHO WORK WITH TOP FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS REFLECT A GROWING PREDCCUPATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS WITH THE SPECTER. OF ANDTHER ANGOLA CLOSER TO HOME. IN THEIR INVENTORY OF ACTUAL TROUBLE SPOTS WHICH THEY CONSIDER VULNERABLE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN OR OTHER SOVIET-SPONSORED FORCES. THE FRENCH ARE: WORRIED MOST ABOUT MOROCCO. FRENCH ANALYSIS IS THAT ALGERIAIS PRESTIGE IN THE THIRD WORLD, LIBYA'S MABSIVE ARMS BUILDUP, KING HASSAN'S FEUDALISTIC INAGE, AND POLISARIO(SUCLAIM TO SELPHOETERMINATION COM-BINE TO GIVE THE BOVIETS AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT THE ANGOLA EXPERIENCE IN THE SAHARA THROUGH SURM ROGATE FORCES DESCRIBED AS ASSISTANCE TO LEGITIMATE INSTITUTIONS.

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AMBASSADOR RUSH COMMENTS THAT THE FRENCH HAVE CLOSE DEFENSE AS WELL AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINKS WITH MOROCCO, A COUNTRY HIGH IN THE FRENCH NATIONAL INTEREST CATEGORY. IN CONVERSATIONS OF THIS SUBJECT, THE FRENCH OFFICIALS TALK ABOUT FRANCE HAVING TO TAKE ACTION IF NEC-

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ESSARY, BUT THESE QUESTIONS ARE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY THE BIG QUESTION -- WILL THE U.S. ALSO STAND BY ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MOROCCOT THE FRENCH STILL HAVE NO HARD EVIDENCE THAT MUROCCO IS NEXT ON THE SOVIET LIST BUT AMBASSADOR RUSH NOTES THAT THEY ARE CLEARLY WORRIED THAT IT HIGHT BE.

25X1

IVORY COAST VIEWS ON ANGOLAS. IN DISCUSSING THE IVORY COAST'S RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA, THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO OUR AMBASE SADOR IN ABIDJAMS

- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IVORY COAST HAD TO RETHINK ITS POSITION IN LIGHT OF THE FAILURE OF THE WEST IN GENERAL AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT TO OFFSET SOVIET/
  CUBAN AID TO THE MPLA. THIS WAS A GRAVE DISTAND AND TO THE MPLA. THIS WAS A GRAVE DISTAND TO THE FACT THAT WFOR THE FIRST TIME! THE MODERATES HAD STUCK TOGETHER IN ADDIS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL MATTERS TO COUNT ON THE DECLARED INTENTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE AN ACTION SINCE IT CAN SUBSEQUENTLY BE RETURNED BY ACTION OF THE CONGRESS.
- THE ANGOLAN SITUATION HAD GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PUTURE OF AFRICA WITH THE SOVIET/CUBAN FOOTHOLD THREATENING TO SPREAD QUICKLY TO ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA, OF EVEN GREATER CONSEQUENCE WAS THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT CUBAN TROOPS WOULD ADVANCE TOWARD AND INTO NAMIBIA, ENGAGE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS, AND HAVE THE ARDENT SUPPORT OF PRACTICALLY ALL THE REST OF AFRICA FOR AN ACTION TO FREE NAMIBIA FROM ITS WHITE COLONIAL YOKE. ANY WESTERN COUNTERSUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA WOULD CLEARLY BE UNWELCOME.
- -- IN THE VIEW OF ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IVORY COAST WAS REASSESSING ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVET UNION. THE AM-

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BASSADOR COMMENTS THAT THE CLEAR IMPLICATION:
WAS THAT THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS, WHICH THE IVORY COAST BROKE
IN 1969 OVER ALLEGED SOVIET ACTIVITY IN STIRRING
UP IVORIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, MIGHT BE IN THE
OFFING.

- THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE IVORY COAST WOULD BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE MPLA TO REDUCE SOVIETYCUBAN PRESENCE IN AMGOLA. THE MPLA HAD WON A TREMENDOUS VICTORY WHICH IT WOULD WANT TO CONSOLIDATE. THE SOVIETS ALSO HAD THEIR FIRST REAL SUCCESS IN AFRICA AND HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INCENTIVE TO LEAVE, GIVEN THE OTHER EXCITING PROSPECTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.
- FOR A POSITIVE, MEANINGFUL U.S. STANCE, HE STILL HOPED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WOULD VISIT AFRICA. HE BELIEVES THE U.S. STILL STANDS AS AN IMPORTANT POWER N AFRICAN EYES, BUT THAT AFRICANS NEED ASSURANCES -- WHICH THEY HAVE NOT HAD RECENTLY -- THAT THE U.S. IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF AFRICA'S FUTURE.

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